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COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: A CALL FOR REFORM
DAVID E. BENNETT
The defense of incompetency to stand trial has
been consistently misunderstood and misused.4
Under the present practice, this doctrine, which
was generated for the benefit of the defendant, is
often utilized to his detriment and is frequently
contrary to the best interests of society as well.
This presents a serious problem because a sub-
stantial number of defendants in criminal cases
come within the purview of the incompetency
doctrine,2 and the trend is toward a greater
number of competency hearings.3 This comment
'fDiscussing the misunderstandings in this area,
Federal District Judge Oliver has stated,
I believe every District Judge will and can
avoid eventual trouble and therefore administerjustice more effectively, if and only if, he ap-
proaches a Section 4244 competency hearing on
the general theory that neither the District
Attorney, the defense attorney, nor any of the
witnesses, professional or otherwise have the
vaguest idea about the purpose of the hearing,
the scope of the evidence, the specific issue for
ultimate decision, or indeed, why everyone is
gathered in your courtroom.
Oliver, J., Judicial Hearings to Determine Mental
Competency to Stand Trial, 39 F.R.D. 537, 545 (1965).
2 For example, in 1962 in New York State 1406 of
the 2142 inmates at Matteawan State Hospital for
the Criminally Insane had been committed because
incompetent to stand trial. T. SzAz, PsycAmarmc
JusrICu 49-50 (1965).
8 See JuDiCAL CONFERENCE or THE DISTRICT or
COLu3mBIA Cracurr, R .EPoaT Or THE CoMMIrTE ON
PRonLEsxs CONNECTED wirH MENTAL. EXAnINATION
or E AccusED N Cmnm AL CASEs BEFORE TRiAL,
147, 155 (1965). In 1957, 87 mental examinations were
will first attempt to explore the dangers posed by
the present practice surrounding the defense of
incapacity to stand trial. Next, it will try to set
forth a workable standard to determine which
defendants are incompetent. Thirdly, the paper
will suggest procedures that might be adopted to
safeguard the interests of the accused and of
society, and examine the proper role of the psy-
chiatrist in the process. Finally, it will discuss the
present disposition made of the incompetent
accused and how this facet might be improved.
At the outset, incompetency to stand trial must
be distinguished from its more glamorous relative,
insanity at the time of the offense. A finding of
competency demonstrates only that a defendant
presently understands the nature of the charges
against him and is able to assist counsel in present-
ing his defense.4 It intimates nothing about his
mental condition at the time of the criminal act.
Therefore, the tests of insanity or criminal re-
sponsibility such as the M'Naghten rule have no
application in this area.5 If the two concepts are
performed. But in 1963 the number jumped to 205.
This increase occurred despite the fact that there were
1,575 defendants who went to trial in 1957 and only
1,308 in 1963.
' See e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-1 (1967);
People v. Aparicio, 38 Cal. 2d 565, 241 P.2d 221 (.1952).5 This test specifies that the defendant is not guilty
of crime if he is unable to distinguish between right
and wrong at the time he committed the act. Daniel
M'Naghten's Case, 10 C]. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
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not kept separate and distinct, it will cause con-
fusion and can further the misuse of the incom-
petency defense. 6
Since the middle of the seventeenth century, it
has been the rule of the common law that a person
cannot be required to plead to an indictment or
stand trial for a crime when he is so mentally dis-
ordered as to be incapable of making a rational
defense. Whenever the trial judge has a reasonable
doubt concerning the defendant's fitness to pro-
ceed, he is obligated to stop the proceedings and
hold a hearing on the issueY
The primary purpose of this doctrine is to pro-
tect the accused's right to a fair trial. It would be a
reproach to justice to put an incompetent defend-
ant to trial, because there may be facts or circum-
stances, of which he alone has knowledge, that can
prove his innocence. Also, it would be inhuman to
put an insane person to trial.8 But in addition to
safeguarding the accused, the incompetency rule
also serves a larger societal interest in maintaining
dignity in the administration of criminal justice.
An adversary trial presupposes an accused who is
capable of defending himself against the accusa-
tions of the state. But the trial of a person, totally
out of contact with reality, would be arbitrary and
irrational, and would tend to undermine public
confidence in the entire system. 9
Today, the federal government and the states
have statutes which codify this common law rule.
-But too many of them focus on the underlying
mental condition of the accused to the detriment
of other considerations. For example, some provide
that a defendant who is "presently insane" 10 or
"mentally ill or defective" 1 or "feeble minded" 12
(1843); Of course the other tests of insanity at the
time of the offense, such as the Durham rule relieving
the defendant of criminal responsibility if his act was
the product of a mental disease or defect, are equally
inapplicable: Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1954).6 Unfortunately semantic similarities have caused
much confusion. Incompetency to stand trial has
often been designated "insanity at the time of the
trial" or "present insanity" which has been confused
with "insanity at the time of the crime".
7Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897); See gen-
erally H. VEIHOPEN, MENTAL DiSOS)ER AS A CRMDINAL
DEFENSE 428-30 (1954).
8 See People v. Bursen, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d
239 (1957); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W.
327 (1910); 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35.
9See Comment: Incompetewy to Stand Trial, 81
HAtv. L. REv. 454,458 (1967).
lo W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-9 (1966).
" VA. CoDE ANNi. 19.1-227 (Supp. 1966).
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1352 (1965). For a discus-
sion of this statute, see Slough & Wilson, Mental
should not be tried, but they often do not set out
what test is to be used in deciding who is sane and
who is insane. This opens up the way for confusion
with the issue of insanity at the time of the crime
and other improper considerations. Many states,
however, are following the lead of the federal pro-
vision" and of the Model Penal Code 4 which set
forth the proper test of incompetence that has
evolved in the case law: whether or not the accused
is able to understand the nature of the charges
against him and to assist in his defense.
DANGERS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
Although the incompetency doctrine has been
used more frequently in recent years, 5 defense
lawyers are often reluctant to raise the issue, in-
deed, they will sometimes risk censure rather than
bring up the defense. 16 Paradoxically, a doctrine
which exists for the protection of the defendant,
often works to his disadvantage." Delay makes it
more difficult for the accused to present his defense
upon regaining his capacity. For example, by the
Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 593,
595-97 (1960).
1318 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964). "Whenever after arrest
and prior to the imposition of sentence.., the United
States attorney has reasonable cause to believe that
the person charged with the offense against the United
States may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally
incompetent as to be unable to understand the nature
of the proceedings against him or properly assist in
his own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial
determination of such mental competency of the
accused ......
14 § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
No person who as a result of mental disease or
defect lacks capacity to understand the proceed-
ings against him or to assist in his own defense shall
be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission
of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.
See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-1 (1967). People
v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N.E. 652 (1921).
is SZAZ, supra n.2 at 252; Foote, A Comment on
Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 832, 833 (1960). The author cites
statistics showing a comparable rise in defendants
committed for incompetency in England.
11 ARCHER, Guznrx & LEwIN, REPORT To MIcHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, PSYIATRIC
EVALUATION IN CRu.INAIL CASES 59 (Mich. Dep't.
of Mental Health, unpublished rep't. 1967) (hereafter
MIcH. RmIp'r.). The authors reached this conclusion
after taking a state wide poll of defense attorneys.
Twenty per cent stated that at one time or other they
concealed a possible incompetency defense. See Evan
v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Mich. 1966)
for the court's censure of a defense counsel who failed
to use an incompetency defense.
7These consequences can be visited upon even an
unwilling defendant because once the incompetency
issue is raised by the prosecutor or the court, the
defendant cannot prevent its being decided. Siedner
v. United States, 260 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 59
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time of trial, witnesses may forget important facts,
or they may disappear from the jurisdiction, or
even be deceased. This problem affects all de-
fendants, but it would seem to place an especially
heavy burden on the indigent who cannot afford
to hire an investigator and counsel to seek out and
keep track of helpful witnesses. Rather, the
penurious defendant must rely on appointed
counsel or public defenders who, although they are
usually quite competent, frequently face stagger-
ing case loads.'3
The commitment which almost always follows a
finding of incompetency for trial imposes signifi-
cant disadvantages on the accused.19 Incompetents
are generally confined in hospitals for the crimi-
nally insane, which, it is fair to say, are usually the
poorest available facilities." The defendant is held
in stricter custody with fewer privileges than if he
were confined in a prison or ordinary mental
hospital .2 He receives little treatment, usually less
than if he had been civilly committed to a mental
institution." And surprisingly, there is evidence
Is At least one half of those accused of felonies are
indigent and must be represented by appointed counsel
or public defenders. See L. SiLVERSTE N, DEFENSE
OF TEE POOR 7-8 (1965). Of course this same difficulty
is presented to the prosecution.
"9 E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-3(b) (1964).
"A person who is found to be incompetent because of
a mental condition shall be committed to the Depart-
ment of Mental Health during the continuance of
that condition."
20 Guttmacher, The Psychiatric Approach to Crime
and Correction, 23 LAw & CoNrEMP. PROB. 633, 645
(1958).
They [psychotic criminals] are usually sent to
criminal divisions of state psychiatric hospitals
for appropriate psychiatric treatment. In passing,
however, the writer might observe that invariably
this is the most unattractive, ill-equipped and
poorly staffed division of our state psychiatric
hospitals.
21 See Brief of Donald McEwan, Petitioner Pro Se,
in KATZ, GoLDsTEIn & DERSEOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PsYcHIATRY AND LAW 700-03 (1967) in which an
inmate lists all the deprivations such as the right to
receive visitors, to send and receive mail, and the
unfavorable discrepancies in professional staff, which
he suffers solely because he is confined to an institu-
tion for the criminally insane.
2" Foote, supra n.15 at 843. To understand how little
treatment is received, it must be remembered that
the average ward patient in a public mental hospital
receives an average of fifteen minutes of psychiatric
treatment a month. Hearings on Constitutional Rights
of the Mentally Ill, Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 638-39, pt. I at 43-44
(1961). See also Fried, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 1319-20 (1963). The author in comparing
confinement at Walpole State Prison with that at
Bridgewater State Mental Hospital says,
[I]t is hard to believe that the regime there
that he would more likely be given the proper
treatment in prison, since some penal institutions
are more willing to recognize the value of treat-
ment methods of other disciplines such as psychol-
ogy and sociology.2n Furthermore, additional
difficulties arise because the staffs of the hospitals
for the criminally insane are not aware of the more
limited therapeutic goals of returning a patient to
fitness for trial. In most instances no distinction
is made between those patients who were found
unfit for trial and those institutionalized because
they possess insane criminal propensities and are
dangerous. The little treatment provided is di-
rected at the more difficult task of restoring in-
competents to full sanity. 4 Some psychiatrists
have estimated that if therapy was directed toward
the more limited goal of readying the accused for
trial, utilizing existing facilities, the majority of
those unfit to proceed could be returned for trial
within a short period of time.5
Another danger is that once the defendant is
subject to this indefinite commitment, he will
spend a substantial period of time in the institu-
tion. A study of those committed to Ionia State
Hospital in Michigan substantiates this assertion.
Of the 470 defendants committed to Ionia between
1954 and 1960, over one-half of these defendants
would spend a substantial period of time there,
many for the rest of their lives.'6 The case of J.C. is
an example. This 63 year old man was committed
as incompetent in 1926 after arrest on a gross
indecency charge. In 1959 he was still there and
showing signs of "simple psychosis." 2 There are
several reasons for this situation. Studies indicate
that because of the nature of the institutions for the
criminally insane and the popular view taken of
those confined therein, a defendant is less likely to
gain release after making comparable progress
can seriously be said to be orientated towards
treatment and cure; too little of the available
resources is left after the inevitable requirements
of administration, confinement and security have
been met.
"Reid, Disposition of the Criminally Insane, 16
RuTGERs L. Rxv. 75, 113 (1961); Eaton, A Psychiatrist
Views Rehabilitation of the Criminal Who Is Mentally
Ill, 4 KAN. L. REv. 356, 360 (1958).
'4 Mich. Rep't. 36.
"5 Hess and Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial:
Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 AmR. J. OF
PsYcHIATRY 713, 716 (1963). These two psychiatrists
made an extensive survey of Michigan practices in
incompetency cases.
26 Comment: Criminal Law-Insane Persons, Com-
petency to Stand Trial, 59 MICH. L. REv. 1078, 1088
(1961).
2Id. at 1089 n.32.
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toward recovery than if he were in a civil institu-
tion. Secondly, there is a lack of procedures for
periodic review of those confined in institutions.
Most statutes merely provide that the superin-
tendent of the hospital should notify the court
when the accused has regained competency.29
As a consequence of this informality, there is a real
danger that even if the accused does regain his
capacity, he can remain forgotten in the institu-
tion.
Furthermore, some defendants who are certified
as competent by the superintendent still encounter
difficulties proceeding to trial. Often they are
competent with the aid of medication such as
tranquilizers, but these medications are not ad-
ministered to the defendant while he is awaiting
trial in the local jail. Consequently, he suffers a
retrogression and is sent back to the institution.8
Also, judges are frequently reluctant to find a de-
fendant competent once he has been classified as
unfit to proceed at a prior time.31
A final difficulty is that the accused suffers a
28 Foote, supra n.15 at 843.
29 E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1531 (1967);
N.Y. CODE Crus. Ppoc. § 662-b2 (McKinney Supp.
1967).30 Studies indicate that many defendants can be
restored to competence by the use of tranquilizers,
such as thorazine, and other modern pharmacological
treatment. Yet judges are suspicious of this process
and often refuse to try an accused who is competent
only with the help of these drugs. They feel that the
defendant is still insane, and it would be unfair to put
him to trial. This reasoning is not necessary to insure
due process of law. If the defendant can aid his attorney
with the help of medication, there is no more reason
not to try him than to refuse to put a diabetic to trial
because he would be incompetent without his insulin.
Much education is necessary to explain to trial judges
the nature and function of this type of pharmacological
treatment.
Also, many defendants who have regained compe-
tence at the institution, suffer a regression because
they are not given their medication in jail while await-
ing trial. This situation could easily be corrected by
issung proper instructions to the warden. These meas-
ures would further the goal of a trial wherever possible,
consistent with due process. See Buschman and Reed,
Tranquilizers and Competency to Stand Trial, 54
A.B.A.J. 284 (1968); MicH. REP'T. 66; Smith, Psy-
chiatric Approaches to the Mentally Ill Federal Offender,
39 F.R.D. 553, 560-61 (1966), for the federal experience.
31 Chief Judge James Monroe of the Third Judicial
Circuit in Illinois stated that many judges feel that
they have a vested interest in their original finding
of incompetency and therefore, tend to adhere to it
even after the defendant has been to an institution
and later certified as competent. Meeting of the Illi-
nois Governor's Committee on Competency to Stand
Trial, Mar. 22, 1968. Perhaps this reluctance is tied
to the view many judges take that the process will
result in a final disposition of the defendant. See text
at p.3 3 -3 6 infra.
greater stigma after confinement in a hospital for
the criminally insane than he would for a detention
in other types of correctional or penal institutions.12
This can make his subsequent adjustment to
society much more difficult. Thus, the net result of
the present system is to impose added liabilities on
those found incompetent to stand trial rather than
returning them to the judicial process as soon as
possible."
The foregoing would be sufficient cause for con-
cern even if the assumption could be made that all
those committed were unable to stand trial and in
need of institutionalization. But this is not neces-
sarily true. The incompetency procedure some-
times becomes the method of final disposition of
defendants who could stand trial, and thus ef-
fectively denies them their constitutional right to
trial28 A recent study of Michigan practice indi-
cates that many defendants are frequently com-
mitted for reasons which have nothing to do with
incompetency. The authors of the Michigan report
sent questionnaires to judges and prosecutors
throughout the state asking what would happen
when there was substantial agreement among ex-
amining psychiatrists that the defendant was
mentally ill at the time of the act. The vast ma-
jority reported that the accused would be adjudged
incompetent before trial and committed to Ionia.
The authors concluded that the prosecutors would
handle the matter this way not only because they
felt that it was more efficient, but also so that they
would not be forced to add an acquittal by reason
of insanity to their records.35 The statistics appear
to support this "final disposition" theory. One
hundred and eighty defendants were returned to
Detroit Recorders Court from Ionia State Hospital
as restored to competency from July 1, 1965
through June 30, 1966. None of this group was
ever brought to trial.3 6 This would seem to indicate
"Foote, supra n.15 at 842.
3Id. at 843.
14 See Hess & Thomas, supra n.25 at 713.
Our conclusion is that the issue of defendant's
competency to be tried was most frequently raised
not on the basis of defendant's mental status but
rather was employed as a means of handling
situations and solving problems for which there
seemed to be no other recourse under the law.
Accord, Bennett & Matthews, The Dilemma of Mental
Disability and the Criminal Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 467
(1968).
3" MicH. REP'T. 6.
36 MiCi. REP'T. 20. A nolle prosequi was entered
for 114 defendants, four of whom were committed to a
civil hospital; fifty-one were returned to Ionia State
Hospital as incompetent; two pleaded guilty to the
original charge and six pleaded guilty to a lesser charge;
[Vol. 59
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that the judges and prosecutors never expected
that these defendants should come to trial. They
are apparently using the incompetency doctrine
as a method of disposing of a troublesome problem
in a short hand fashion.
The psychiatrists also further this use of in-
competency for "final disposition." They fre-
quently do not understand or do not adhere
strictly to the test of incompetency, but equate
unfitness for trial with mental illness. 7 And they
find incompetent, defendants whom they feel
should be relieved of criminal responsibility be-
cause of their mental disease, but whom the doctors
do not think will fall within the test of insanity at
the time of the crime." Since the trial court often
accepts the psychiatrist's conclusion as determina-
tive without questioning his reasons,39 there is
danger that defendants are found incompetent who
are capable of standing trial. Hence, the incom-
petency procedure, far from fulfilling its role as a
temporary protective device until the defendant
is ready for trial, closely resembles an alternative
to the regular penal system.
Psychiatrists point out that this procedure often
visits adverse affects upon those found incompe-
tent.4" Some defendants, particularly those of the
mildly paranoid type, feel a sense of grievance that
they have been shunted off to a mental hospital
without their day in court. This grievance, to-
gether with the uncertainty generated by an
impending trial and possible punishment, can
hinder therapy. The borderline case, that is, the
defendant, who although mentally disturbed in some
fashion could stand trial, may deteriorate under
these circumstances and perhaps spend the re-
mainder of his life in the mental institution.
The state's interests can also be harmed under
two were placed on probation and one defendant was
sentenced on the original charge; the fate of six of the
accused was unknown. The report does not indicate
how long these defendants spent in the mental hospital
before being returned to the court. But an earlier
report indicated that many defendants spent sub-
stantial time there, often longer than the sentence set
out for the crime with which they were charged. See
text at n.26 supra.
17 SzAz, supra n.2 at 25. See Vann and Morganroth,
The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the Compe-
tence to Stand Trial, 43 U. DET. L. J. 1 (1965).
38 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04, Comment at 195
(Tent. Draft No. 4," 1954); although this problem
occurs in all jurisdictions, it seems to be most prevalent
in those which adhere to the M'Naghten Rule, because
psychiatrists generally consider it to be a strict test of
responsibility. Reid, supra n.23 at 93.
9 McH. REP'T. 19.
40 Guttmacher, Institute on Sentencing, Remarks, 37
F.R.D. 111, 131 (1964).
the present system. The prosecutor might have
difficulty proving his case against the defendant
after some years have passed. Also, current practice
would seem to undermine the societal goal that the
incompetency doctrine was designed to protect:
public respect for the fairness of the adversary
system. A complete trial before the defendant is
subjected to confinement would give the public a
greater feeling of security that justice had been
done, and that the confinement was rationally
imposed.
STANDARD OF INCorPETENCY
Generally, it is stated that a defendant is in-
competent to stand trial if he is unable to under-
stand the charges against him, or if he is unable to
assist in his defense." Although this test is easy to
enunciate, it is difficult to apply." At early common
law the standard required that the defendant be
totally insane, and it did not contemplate that a
mental disorder less than complete madness could
render him incompetent.43 Today, due to the em-
phasis upon the behavioral sciences, the test has
widened to include defendants suffering from a
lesser degree of mental disturbance. The courts
have tended to focus on the fact of mental disease,
as opposed to strictly concentrating on the test
itself, and thereby equate incompetency with the
presence of serious mental disease, such as psycho-
sis.4
This has not been a beneficial policy. It is basic
to the adversary system that all defendants who are
" E.g., 18. U.S.C. §4244 (1964);IL.Rxv.STAT.,ch. 38,§ 104-1 (1967).
41 See Hess & Thomas, supra n.25 at 719-20 for a
discussion of the inherent difficulty of a test for in-
competency. These two psychiatrists maintain that
concurrence of opinion between the medical and legal
professions in this area can take place only in the case
of those defendants who are so ill either psychically
or organically as to be uncommunicative or to present
such a public spectacle as to embarrass our sensibilities
of fairness and decorum.
4United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 887, 891
(No. 15, 577) (C.C.D.C. 1835) 1 HMuE, PiEAS OF T
CRowN 35; see generally WEmoIFEN, supra n.7 at
428-30.
44This phenomenon although generally recognized,
is not always praised. See SzAz, supra n.2 at 252. "[The
concept of incompetence to stand trial has become
greatly expanded during the last few decades. Thus,
common sense judgments about competence to stand
trial were abandoned and were replaced by psychiatric
pronouncements about 'mental diseases.' The result is
a mystification of the process of establishing competence
for standing trial and inoculation in the public opinion
of a belief in a causal connection between mental illness
and incompetency to stand trial.... This linkage is
responsible for denial of the right to stand trial."
1968]
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justly able to stand trial do so. Yet, under the
courts' present method of applying the test, many
defendants are declared incompetent who are
properly able to stand trial, because the presence
of mental disease does not necessarily mean that
the defendant is incompetent.45 As noted above, a
condition of incompetency poses substantial
dangers to the accused. Also, because of this focus
on mental illness, other defendants who might be
equally hampered in making their defenses be-
cause of reasons other than typical insanity, such
as amnesiacs or narcotics addicts, are denied con-
sideration.
In order to restrict the incompetency doctrine
to its true purpose, the trial court should adopt a
functional test. The defendant should be found
unfit to proceed not simply because he has some
type of mental illness, but because he cannot
properly perform his role at the trial. That is, the
trial judge should focus on those characteristics
which the defendant needs in order to understand
the charges against him or to assist in his defense.
46
As a consequence of following this test, it would
seem that many defendants who are now found
unfit to proceed on the basis of a psychiatrist's
report that they were psychotic will be brought
to trial without prejudice to their interests. More-
over, the door is open for a more realistic deter-
mination of the competency of those accused who
are unable to make their defense fairly for reasons
other than typical insanity.
The functional test does not envision that the
defendant must completely comprehend intricate
legal strategies and procedures.47 Because counsel
45 Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir.
1964); Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945).
Smith, Psychiatric Examinations in Federal Mental
Competency Hearings, 37 F.R.D. 171, 174 (1964).
46 See Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 820
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissent): "The question in any
case is whether the mental illness has disabled the
specific functions of personality which sound policy
in the administration of justice require before the
accused may be subjected to adversary proceedings on
the charges against him." See generally SzAz, supra n.2
at 25; Silving, The Criminal Law of Mental Incapacity,
53 3. Cim. L. C. & P.S. 129, 139-142 (1962).
47The suggestion has been made that the test for
competency should be whether or not the defendant
has the ability to conduct his defense pro se. Silving,
supra n.46 at 140-41. This formulation seems to be
overly strict. All defendants have a greater or lesser
ability to cope with the judicial process, indeed, it is
doubtful that anyone but a criminal lawyer can under-
stand it fully. Moreover it would militate against the
policy goal of keeping the number of those who are
found incompetent as small as is possible consistent
with due process. For example, many defendants of
must be appointed in every felony case, it is only
necessary that the defendant be able to assist his
attorney. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia took this tack in Lyles v. United States:
"To assist in his defense" of course does not refer
to legal questions involved but to such phases of a
defense as the defendant usually assists in such as
accounts of facts, names of witnesses, etc. s
It is very important that defense counsel be able
to establish rapport with the defendant. If the
accused is so delusional or paranoid that he will
not trust his counsel or tell him the true facts, then
he would be incompetent.49 The defendant must
be able to follow the evidence, assist counsel in
evaluating the testimony of witnesses, and be able
to meet the stresses of a long trial without his
rationality or judgment breaking down. 5°
The specific qualities of mind that the defendant
must possess to properly perform his role as de-
fendant can be separated into four basic categories:
(1) contact with reality; (2) minimum intelligence;
(3) rationality and (4) memory.
Most obviously, the defendant must have a
minimal contact with reality. This encompasses the
basic human functions that are automatic to all but
the seriously mentally ill. An accused must ap-
preciate his presence in relation to time, place, and
things. He must realize that he is in a court of
justice, charged with a criminal offense; that there
is a judge on the bench, a prosecutor attempting to
convict him; a lawyer who will undertake to defend
him against that charge; and a jury that will pass
on the evidence presented. 5 A psychiatrist might
low intelligence would be able to relate relevant facts
to assist their counsel, but would be hard pressed to
plan their own defense strategy.
48 254 F.2d 725, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also
Gregori v. United States, 243 F.2d 48, 54 (5th Cir. 1947)
in which the court noted, "A lower standard of mental
ability may be sufficient if defendant is represented by
counsel than if he is not so protected."49 See, e.g., Pouncey v. United States, 349 F.2d 699
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Wider v. United States, 348 F.2d 358(D.C. Cir. 1965); Aponte v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 153
A.2d 665 (1959); People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 143
N.E.2d 239 (1957).
10Interview with James Doherty, Chief of the
Appeals Division, Cook County Public Defender,
March 28, 1968.
51 See list set down by Chief Judge Ridge in Weitner
v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1961). The
clearest enunciation of what qualities should be con-
sidered by the trial judge in determining mental capac-
ity have appeared in the opinions of the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Missouri. The
Federal Medical Center, an excellent institution to
which those accused of federal crimes are often sent for
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term this ability "perception," that is, the process
of becoming aware of his surroundings. If missing,
this is the easiest quality to detect, as the defendant
without it will be very disorientated.
Next, the defendant must possess the minimum
intelligence necessary to grasp the significance of
the events taking place. This requirement can be
met by the vast majority of those accused of crime,
although occasionally a defendant is so mentally
defective that he cannot meet the burden. For
example, the conviction of an adult defendant who
had a mental age of six years was reversed because
he did not have the intelligence to understand the
charges against him and the nature of the pro-
ceedings.n
The foregoing qualities are basic to competency,
but they are not sufficient in themselves. The de-
fendant must also possess rationality. In Dusky v.
United States, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed and remanded for further findings
stating that it was not enough for the district judge
to find that "the defendant is orientated to time
and place." 0 Rather the test was said to be:
Whether he has sufficient present ability to con-
suit with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding, and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him.14
Although the Supreme Court did not precisely
define rationality, it might be explained in terms of
a defendant's insight and judgment.55 He must
have proper insight into himself and his situation
so that his emotional and intellectual responses are
commensurate with reality. Also, the accused must
be capable of exercising judgment, that is, balanc-
ing his past, present, and future concerns with the
demands of reality. If a defendant lacks a reason-
able degree of insight and judgment, he may suffer
delusions, illusions, and inappropriate emotional
responses that will make it impossible to establish
the rapport with counsel that is so important. And,
he may not appreciate his situation which could
comprehensive mental examinations, is located within
the district.
12 State v. Caralluzzo, 49 N.J. 152, 228 A.2d 693
(1967).
3 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
u Id. at 402.
6 Interview with Dr. S. Kesert, M.D., a private
psychiatrist with substantial experience in performing
competency examinations in Cook County, April 19,
1968; WATSON, PSYcniATRY Fo1 LAWYERS (Mimeo
Draft No. 3 1960) (unpublished, cited in MicH. REP'T.
47).
cause him to do or say foolish things, harmful to his
best interests. For example, the defendant might
attempt to conduct his own defense and argue to
the jurors that he was God and was being perse-
cuted by men."6 Such actions would not only inter-
fere with the accuracy of the proceedings, but
would also undermine the dignity of the judicial
process.
The final characteristic the defendant must
possess is memory. More than anything else the
defense counsel must know the facts and the exist-
ence of any possible witness to the crime. In many
cases where the accused was found to be unfit to
proceed because of insanity or mental illness, his
inability to remember pertinent events was a key
factor in this finding. The Supreme Court of
Illinois has stressed that the defendant should be
able to cooperate with his counsel so that any
available defense could be interposed.u This is by
no means a recent development. In Youtsey v.
United States,2 the court of appeals reversed a
conviction of embezzlement and ordered a com-
petency hearing for a defendant who claimed that
his memory was impaired by epilepsy so that he
could not remember the transaction involved. This
issue of memory vis-a-vis competency was also
clearly isolated in United States v. Sermon." The
examining psychiatrists found that the defendant
understood the nature of the charges against him;
but could not assist counsel because of impaired
memory caused by cerebral arteriosclerosis. The
court stressed that the primary assistance that
must be rendered counsel was the full revelation of
facts which arein legitimate dispute and within the
defendant's knowledge.60 Thus if the defendant's
memory was impaired by a general mental illness,
many courts would find him incompetent.
The functional test would allow the courts to
deal properly with the defendant who may be un-
able to assist counsel for some reason other than
general mental illness. Although his inability to
remember facts that may be favorable to his de-
fense is equally injurious to the amnesiac, the
courts have consistently held that amnesia, stand-
" People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239
(1957).67Id. at 369; 143 N.E.2d at 245.
53 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). See also United States
v. Chrisholm, 149 F. 284 (S.D. Ala. 1906), where thejudge in his instruction to the jury, convened to decide
competency, included the element of memory as im-
portant to a finding of fitness to proceed.
59 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1964).60 Id. at 977.
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ing alone, does not constitute such general un-
soundness of mind as to render the accused in-
competent,6' and have put forward several policy
reasons to bolster this opposition to incapacity be-
cause of amnesia.
First, there is the fear that the defendant may
present a false claim, and it is sometimes difficult to
detect a malingerer. Secondly, it is urged that such
a finding would negate all criminal responsibility
for the amnesiac. Furthermore, opponents contend
that it would turn over the determination of
criminal liability to psychiatrists whose opinions
are largely based on the defendant's self-serving
statements. This would render the protection of
society from crime and criminals far more difficult
than ever before.6' Finally, it can be argued that
this rule would place an undue burden on the ad-
ministration of criminal justice, because of the
difficulty of determining whether or not the de-
fendant's claim is valid.
Recently two courts, in attempting to resolve
this problem, have abandoned the traditional rule
and adopted a functional approach. The Supreme
Court of Arizona reversed a conviction solely on
the basis of amnesia.6 3 The defendant, suffering
from amnesia of uncertain duration and type, had
filed a motion for further medical tests which the
trial judge had denied. The higher court recognized
that amnesia could severely hamper the de-
fendant's ability to assist in his defense and re-
versed. The court reasoned that the trial of a man
with an uncertain type of amnesia was a "re-
proach to justice" because further examination
might have revealed his amnesia to be curable."
Although this decision deals only with amnesia as a
temporary condition, a reasonable continuance for
61 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Price, 421 Pa. 396,
218 A.2d 758, cert. den. 385 U.S. 869 (1966); State v.
Swails, 233 La. 751, 66 So.2d 796 (1953); See generally,
Comment: A Case Study in tle Limits of Particular
Justice, 71 YAm L. J. 109 (1961). This is also the
English view. See Regina v. Podola [19591 3 All. E.R.
418.
12 Commonwealth v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 406-7, 218
A.2d 758, 763, cert. den. 385 U.S. 869 (1966). See also
Blackner v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1961); United States v. Olvera, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 15
C.M.R. 134 (1954).3State v. McClendon, 101 Ariz. 285, 419 P.2d 69
(1966).64 See also Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99,
338 P.2d 447 (1959). The Supreme Court of California
reversed a conviction because the trial judge did not
allow a hypnotist to accompany the defendant's at-
torney in an attempt to help the accused regain his
memory.
treatment certainly is a positive approach in the
situation where there is still a possibility of cure.
But amnesia can also be permanent, " and this
presents a more difficult question. What should the
court do if the defendant has had reasonable con-
tinuances and the amnesia still persists? If the
defendant is considered to be incompetent he, may
be held for the rest of his life in custody without a
trial, or if released, he may go free without proper
punishment. In Wilson v. United States,6' judge
Bazelon attempted a solution. The government
admitted that the defendant suffered from genuine,
permanent retrograde amnesia. The court rejected
the theory that amnesia per se is incompetency.
But it held that loss of memory should bar prosecu-
tion where unrecalled facts might be crucial to the
construction and presentation of a possible de-
fense. The dissenting opinion would have gone
further and held that where the defendant has
involuntarily lost total recollection, any conviction
is a violation of due process.6'
The case by case method adopted by the ma-
jority in Wilson appears to be the soundest ap-
proach.68 As stated above, it is anomalous and un-
reasonable to find that an amnesiac defendant can
never meet the common law test of incompetence.
He may be just as hampered from aiding his
counsel in presenting a valid defense as is a de-
fendant whose difficulty springs from mental dis-
ease.
The policy objections are not insoluble either.
Although it is true that more defendants might be
tempted to feign amnesia than other mental dis-
orders, psychiatrists can generally detect the
malingerer. 69 The other policy objections apply
"1 This problem can spring from many causes, such
as epilepsy, head injury, hysteria, alcoholism, drug
intoxication or psychosis. Sometimes the amnesic's
memory can be brought back as is often the case with
amnesia caused by hysteria; but the loss can be per-
manent as usually happens where organic brain
damage is the cause. McDONALD, PsYcHiATRY AND
CsmuINAL 89 (1958).
66391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968); reversing 263 F.
Supp. 528 (D.D.C. 1966). The Fourth Circuit has also
reversed the conviction of a defendant because of in-
competence in part due to amnesia. United States v.
Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964).
17 Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir.
1968). See also dissent in Commonwealth v. Price, 421
Pa. 396, 407-8 218 A.2d 758, 764 in which it was urged
that the conviction of an amnesic is a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.68 For a contrary view see Note: Criminal Law-Abil-
ity to Stand Trial-Amnesia 52 IowA L. tlv. 339,
343-44 (1966).
69 McDoxAm supra n.65 at 89. Also, Dr. Kesert
stated that the psychiatrist by careful examination
[Vol. 59
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
equally to the accused incompetent because of
mental illness and are not insoluble in that area7
It would seem no more objectionable if occasionally
an amnesiac escapes punishment than if an oc-
casional psychotic doesYn This is not to say that
every amnesiac should be found unfit to proceed.
If the facts necessary can be gathered from other
sources or a defense such as an alibi can be estab-
lished without the defendant's assistance, sound
policy would require that the accused be put to
trial. The judge can make an in camera investiga-
tion of the defense claim to determine if counsel was
truly hampered by amnesia. This approach was
adopted in United States v. Sermon,72 where the
court decided that defense counsel had sufficient
information to go to trial. Under this approach it
would be the rare occasion where the defendant
could not be tried because of amnesia.
The doctrinaire approach of the dissent in Wilson
-that it is a violation of due process to try any
amnesiac-is not satisfactory. If the defendant is
not seriously handicapped by his inability to re-
member, there is no reason for keeping him from
trial. Both the policy of an efficacious administra-
tion of criminal justice and the possible dangers to
the accused himself suggest that he should stand
trial
A second example of the functional approach is
in a recent case involving a narcotics addict. In
Hansford v. United States,7' the defendant's con-
viction for possession of narcotics was reversed
because the trial judge did not convene a com-
petency hearing when he discovered that the ac-
cused was using narcotics during the trial. Judge
Bazelon stressed that the accused could have been
suffering from a chronic brain syndrome which
might render him unfit for trial when he was using
is able to detect the malingerer. Interview, April 19,
1968. For a contrary view, see Comment supra n.61
at 123. Such pre-trial procedures must be conducted in
such a fashion as to uphold the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. It has been argued that by
pleading amnesia in bar of trial, a defendant waives his
privilege or that the privilege does not apply to the col-
lateral proceedings to determine present capacity.
Hunt v. State, 248 AJa. 217, 27 So.2d 186 (1946) (dic-
tum). However, the best approach is that adopted by
the federal courts. There is a specific statutory prohibi-
tion against admitting any statement made by the
accused during a medical examination into evidence on
the issue of guilt or innocence. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964).70 Accord Note: Capacity to Stand Trial: The Amnesic
Criminal Defendant, 27 MD. L. REv. 182 (1967).71 It is suggested that courts' historical difference in
attitude between the two disabilities lies in sympathy
for the mentally ill defendant that is not present for the
amnesic.
72 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D.Mo. 1964).
365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
narcotics.74 The important fact to notice is that the
court has abandoned the fixation on mental disease
and recognized that the defendant might be
equally incompetent whatever the cause.
In applying the functional test, the mental con-
dition of the defendant must not be evaluated in a
vacuum, but must be considered in relation to the
circumstances of the case. The anticipated length
and complexity of the trial is an important factor.
A defendant who would be competent for a one day
trial might well deteriorate under the stress of a
long proceeding. Similarly, a defense against cer-
tain crimes might require a lesser degree of com-
petency than against others. For example, it is
easier for an accused to assist in a defense to the
crime of rape than in a conspiracy charge involving
many complicated transactions. Moreover, crimes
for which specific intent is required, such as
larceny, would require a greater degree of compe-
tence than a crime such as rape where the criminal
intent is assumed from the actY5 In those offenses
requiring specific intent, there are added defenses
which often can only be presented by the defend-
ant.
PRoCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Raising the Competency Issue
The issue of fitness to proceed may be raised by
the prosecution, defense or the courtY6 Even
though neither party raises the question of fitness,
the trial judge must raise it himself if, before or
during the trial, he has a doubt concerning the
defendant's competencyY Then the judge will
usually order that the defendant be examined by a
psychiatrist or that he be committed to a mental
institution for a short period to be examined. If
the defendant's history, present conduct, or the
examination indicate some evidence of incompe-
tence, the judge will halt the proceedings and hold
a full hearing on the issueY9
71Judge Bazelon also stated that if the addict did
not have his drugs, he might be rendered incompetent
because of withdrawal pains. Id. at 923-24. But see
United States v. Tom, 340 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1965).75See generally J. HAL, GENERAL PPlNcIPLEs OF
= CuMnmAL LAW, 143-44 (1960).
7 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE: § 1368 (West 1956); N.Y.
CODE CRm. PRoc. § 658 (McKinney 1958).
7Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). It is a
violation of due process of law for the judge to try an
incompetent even though the defense did not specifi-
cally raise the issue.78 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964).
79 Some statutes provide for a hearing by the judge
alone. Others have a provision for a jury. See, e.g., IM.
REv. STAT. ch.38, § 104-1 (1967). It has been held that
Pate did not remove all discretion from the trial judge,
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The prosecutor or judge is permitted to raise
the issue for the protection of the incompetent
defendant.80 But it appears that this procedure, far
from insuring due process, can actually operate to
endanger the rights of the unwilling defendant. It
gives the prosecutor a totally unwarranted tactical
advantage. Instead of being given the opportunity
to stand trial for a crime, which even upon con-
viction will result in a determinate sentence, the
defendant, contrary to his counsel's desire, runs the
risk of confinement in a mental institution for an
indeterminate period without a trial. This danger
is enhanced by the propensity of psychiatrists to
equate incompetency with mental illness and the
court's willingness to accept the doctor's reports as
conclusive.8' Indeed, as indicated above, judges and
prosecutors view the incompetency procedure as a
method of final disposition of offenders.' 2 Thus, the
unfitness to proceed doctrine can be and sometimes
has become a device to assure custody over persons
where there has been no judical determination of
guilt.
The position set forth in the statutes and stressed
in Pate v. Robinsonw ' 3 that the judge can and indeed
must raise the issue to insure due process, does not
seem necessary in view of the defendant's right to
have counsel provided in every felony prosecu-
tion.P Counsel for the defendant is in a much
better position to determine initially if the de-
fendant can cooperate with him sufficiently to
present a defense. It can be argued that many
indigents are represented by overworked public
defenders and appointed counsel, who may not
have much opportunity to confer with the accused.
But even in this circumstance, defense counsel
would usually have more contact with the accused
than the prosecutor, and is still in the best position
to map strategy for his own client.
The defense of insanity at the time of the crime
cannot be used to a defendant's detriment. The
and thus there is no constitutional command to hold a
hearing every time the issue arises. Green v. United
States, 383 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1967).80 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
" See text at n.88-93, infra.
"See text at n.34-36, supra.
83 383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966). Delay of trial because
of a finding of incompetency does not violate the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
even though the accused objects. United States v.
Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (D. Vt. 1955).
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See
Note: Criminal Procedure: Trial Judge Must Convene
Competence Hearings Sua Sponte When Record Produces
Bona Fide Doubt as to Defendant's Fitness to Stand Trial
Notwithstanding the Absence of a Request, 12 ViL. L.
REv. 655 (1967).
same rule should apply in the competency area. In
Lynch v. Overholzer,"5 the defendant attempted to
plead guilty to a charge of passing worthless checks.
The trial judge, refusing to accept the plea, found
him not guilty by reason of insanity and committed
him to a mental hospital. Reversing this decision,
the Supreme Court of the United States stressed
that this defense was evolved for the benefit of a
defendant, and it should not be utilized assiduously
to his disadvantage.
Also, if the defendant had the sole responsibility
to raise the issue, it might well decrease the num-
ber of reversals on appeal and collateral attacks.
Today a defendant can refrain from raising the
issue at the trial. Later, on appeal or habeas
corpus, he contends that he was incompetent at
the time of the crime because of a history of mental
illness or peculiar past conduct, and agrues that
the judge should have sua sponte convened a
competency hearing."' He may be successful be-
cause the appellate courts have not defined the
quantum of doubt that the trial judge must have
in his mind before raising the issue. Then a new
trial usually results because it is, impossible to
determine competency retrospectively. This
problem could be alleviated by placing the burden
on the defendant to raise the issue at the trial. He
should only be able to raise it for the first time on
appeal when he can demonstrate incompetency of
counsel.
Role of the Psychiatrist
The cases have consistently held that the court
should make the final determination of incompe-
tency." The psychiatrist ideally serves as an expert
witness whose function it is to advise the court in
making its decision." But in the present practice,
the psychiatrist often assumes a totally different
role, indeed, in many cases the psychiatrist is
actually the judge. Studies indicate that many trial
judges accept without question the psychiatrist's
report, and as a consequence the standard of fit-
5 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
"6 See, e.g., State v. Jensen, - Minn. -, 153 N.W.
2d 339 (1967).
87 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960).
8E.g., Sessoms v. United States, 359 F.2d 268
(D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F.
Supp. 630 (W.D.Pa. 1951). In this case the district
court refused to accept psychiatric testimony which
confused mental illness with incompetency.
"Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); Magnus, Mental Incompetency, 18 BAyoiP
L. REv. 22, 41-2 (1966).
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ness to stand trial becomes discretionary with the
psychiatric experts.90
This can cause serious problems for the correct
application of the incompetency doctrine. Many
psychiatrists who are called upon to make these
examinations do not fully understand the purpose
and scope of the legal concept of incompetency.
Frequently the doctor will equate unfitness to
proceed with mental illness or mix incompetency
with criminal responsibility.91 Also, some doctors
have expressed the attitude that the iricompetency
procedure presents an opportunity for avoiding the
punishment of a mentally ill individual. Thus the
psychiatrist will find a defendant incompetent
where the doctor feels that the defendant's mental
state negates his guilt, but fears he will not come
within the insanity test.9
2
Also, the doctors' reports are often mere con-
clusions, such as "defendant is incompetent and
psychotic." They do not give the reasons or
method by which the psychiatrist reached his
determination. 3 These factors result in findng
many defendants as incompetent who can meet the
requisite standards of fitness for trial.
It might be suggested that the determination of
competency could best be made by a panel of
lawyers and laymen, and there is no need for the
psychiatrist in the proceedings. It can be argued
that the lack of understanding and sympathy of
psychiatrists for the legal profession, as illustrated
above, substantially diminishes their value as
advisors. Furthermore, the concept of fitness to
proceed is a strictly legal one, and is not related to
the kinds of knowledge psychiatrists are trained to
gather. After all, it is contended, a lawyer is in the
best position to tell if the defendant can assist him.
It is submitted that the psychiatrist does have a
vital role to play in the process. Although the judge
should make the ultimate determination, this is a
situation that demands expertise in the field of
human behavior. The psychiatrist is not an oracle
or fortune teller, but by training and experience he
is a man possessed of a certain modicum of wisdom
about human beings and their behavior.9 4 This
0 Vann and Morganroth, supra n.37 at 3.
9 MicE. REP'T. 42.
9 Vann and Morganroth, Psychiatrists and the
Competence to Stand Trial, 42 U. DET. L. J. 75, 81-85
(1964).93 Mic. REP'T. 9 "Few facts are given which describe
a defendant's mental impairment in terms of how it will
detract from his ability to participate in his defense."
"See Diamond & Lousell, The Psychiatrist as an
Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations,
63 Mca. L. REv. 1335 (1965). Smith, Psychiatric
knowledge should be put to use in evaluating the
accused person. For example, his ability may be
needed to decide if the defendant is malingering, or
whether or not the defendant under the cloak of
apparent rationality lacks the judgment necessary
to appreciate his situation.
The solution lies in informing the psychiatiist of
the true nature of the incompetency doctrine, and
what functions the defendant must perform in thb
adversary system, so that the doctor is able to
supply truly useful information. Also, the court
should demand to know the reasons behind the
expert's conclusion that the defendant is unfit for
trial and the reasoning process by which the doctor
arrived at his opinion. The doctor would then be
compelled in his report and in his testimony to
describe the defendant's mental impairment in
specific terms of how it will detract from his ability
to stand trial. Thus, he would fulfill his true role as
an expert.
A practical suggestion to insure more accurate
psychiatric examination is to set up special psychi-
atric institutes to which a defendant could be sent
to determine competency. They could be modeled
after the Federal Medical Center in Springfield,
Missouri,95 or be similar to the clinic attached to
the Recorder's Court in Detroit." This would in-
sure that the examiniations were made by psychia-
trists who both understood and were sympathetic
to the true aims of the incompetency doctrine.
Further Procedures to Safeguard the Innocent
Accused
One of the dangers of the incompetency process
is that a defendant who is not guilty of the crime
charged or who could not be convicted will none-
theless be committed as incompetent. An extreme
Examinations in Federal Mental Competency Proceed-
ings, 37 F.R.D. 171 (1964).
95 This center has extensive psychiatric and medical
facilities and performs many competency examinations
each year. Settle & Oppegard, The Pre-Trial Examina-
tion of Federal Defendants, 35 F.R.D. 475 (1964).
96 Mxca. REP'T. 17. This clinic has a staff of three
psychiatrists, ten psychologists, one physician and ten
stenographers. The clinic has facilities for psychological
testing and for gathering data about the defendant's
social and medical history. In contrast, Cook County
has only two psychiatrists with a small clerical staff,
the Behavior Clinic of the Criminal Division of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, to perform a great
many of its psychiatric examinations. Also, it might
be argued that indigents should be provided with funds
for a psychiatrist to ensure a fair determination. This




example is United States v. Barnes," where the de-
fendant was declared incompetent to attend the
hearing at which the charge against him would
have been dismissed because of the government's
delay in bringing him to trial. Several steps can be
taken to remedy this situation. First, the defendant
should be allowed to assert any legal defense, such
as lack of venue or point out any legal defect in the
prosecution's case, such as an illegal search and
seizure. For example, in United States v. Marino9"
the court ruled favorably on the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint as insufficient be-
fore ruling on the incompetency issue. A further
reaching proposal would permit the defendant by
his counsel to raise any affirmative defense such
as an alibi or point out any fatal factual defect in
the prosecutor's case. If the issue was decided in
the defendant's favor, he would be released, if not,
he would still be entitled to a trial upon regaining
competency.9 9 A third suggestion is that whenever
the defendant's incompetency appears to be long
enduring, there be a tentative trial. In this pro-
ceeding the defendant could be acquitted, but if
convicted, he would be entitled to a new trial upon
regaining his competence. The first proposal can be
put into effect immediately with little difficulty.
The latter two would offer further safeguards for
the accused, but more study is necessary to deter-
mine if they are administratively feasible.
DISPOSITION OF THOSE FouND INcomrPETENT
In most jurisdictions those defendants who are
found unfit to proceed are automatically com-
mitted to mental institutions until such time as
9175 F.Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959). In this case four
defendants were indicted for the same robbery. The
indictment was dismissed as to three of them because
of a violation of the right to a speedy trial. But it was
not dismissed as to Barnes because it was found that
he was incompetent and could not assist his counsel.
Hence, he was returned to indefinite confinement
although he was never convicted of crime, nor was there
a determination that he was dangerous to society. For
a criticism of this case, see Foote supra n.15 at 832.
Is 148 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
99 See Foote supra n.15 at 841. An interesting pro-
cedural question would be raised by such a plan: could
either party use testimony recorded at the first pro-
ceeding at the second trial in the event a witness be-
came unavailable? There might be a constitutional
objection to such use by the state. It can be argued
that the defendant's counsel was unable to cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses properly because of
the accused's incapacity, and this violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. There would seem
to be no objection to the defendant making use of such
testimony.
they gain the ability to stand trial.10 The sole
justification of these commitments is that the de-
fendant will receive treatment that will aid him in
regaining competence. There is no finding that the
defendant has perpetrated a crime, nor is there a
finding that the accused is dangerous to himself or
others, as would be required under a civil commit-
ment statute with all of its requisite safeguards.'0'
Thus, theoretically, the incompetency doctrine
should function solely as a protection for the de-
fendant and not as a means to protect society. But
the use of automatic commitment has permitted
the doctrine to be used as a surreptitious method
of final disposition of the defendant without a trial
and without a finding that he is dangerous." 2
There is strong reason to believe that this auto-
matic commitment procedure is not sound policy.
Research indicates that many non-dangerous de-
fendants who could regain competency deteriorate
further when placed in these inadequate institu-
tions.19 Furthermore, present practice assumes
that all incompetents can be helped by treatment,
which is not necessarily true. Some defendants
may never be able to be tried, yet they may not be
dangerous to society. To institutionalize these two
types of defendants summarily when treatment
might be provided either by private facilities or
on an outpatient basis, is a waste of the state's
resources. The staff and facilities of state mental
hospitals are already drastically overextended. If
these defendants were not committed and held
indefinitely, the staff could concentrate on those
people susceptible to treatment in the institutional
setting and those who must be hospitalized because
they are dangerous. This would likely result in
more defendants being returned for trial without
substantial detriment to the state.
In addition to being poor policy, these automatic
commitments raise the spectre of possible viola-
tions of the defendant's constitutional rights.
Confinement without effective treatment or
where treatment will not assist the defendant may
be a denial of liberty without due process of law.
100See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(a) (1967);
ILL. R v. STAT. ch.38, § 104-1 (1967).
101 Sullivan v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 545, 550
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). Despite the fact that no determina-
tion of dangerousness to society is made, courts have
stated that protection of society is a rationale for
incompetency confinements. E.g., Greenwood v. United
States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
' Of course, this use of the doctrine is strengthened
by the improper fashion in which determination of
competency is made.
103Foote, supra n.15 at 843; see text at n.20-27,
supra.
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COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The state confines the accused on the theory that
he will receive the treatment necessary to become
competent. But if the state does not provide
such treatment, it has no valid basis for detain-
ing the defendant and is doing so without due
process. This rationale has been accepted in the
analagous situation of a defendant found not
guilty by reason of insanity. 14 In Rouse v.
Cameron, 120 the accused, after acquittal for this
reason, was committed under the District of
Columbia's mandatory commitment provision.
The court of appeals, noting that part of the basis
for confinement was treatment, stated that a
failure to supply such treatment could raise the
issue of a violation of due process. The court also
stated that inadequacy of hospital staffs and
facilities was no excuse and remanded for further
findings on the treatment issue. The reasoning of
the court is even more applicable in the com-
petency area, since it has been held that in the
acquittal by insanity situation, part of the basis
underlying commitment is the protection of
society. But this justification is not present in the
case of the accused who is unfit for trial.
Moreover, even assuming treatment could be
provided in the institution, confinement might be a
violation of due process in situations where the
defendant is not dangerous. In State v. Caralluzzo,05
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that it was
a violation of due process to confine a defendant
who did not have the capacity to stand trial be-
cause of a low mental age, without an affirmative
finding of danger to society. This seems to be a
well reasoned rule. It is a general principle that
deprivation of liberty should not go beyond what is
necessary for society's or the mentally ill person's
protection.10' And if the state could provide ef-
fective treatment by means of outpatient clinics or
111See Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater
State Hospital, - Mass. -, 223 N.E.2d 908 (1968);
see also Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Some writers have urged that it may be a violation of
constitutional rights to confine anyone in a mental
hospital without providing remedial treatment; Birn-
baum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960);
Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and
Treatment, 15 DE PAu. L. R.v. 291 (1965).
105 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
1O 49 N.J. 152, 228 A.2d 693 (1967).107 "A system which presupposes innocence requires
that preconviction sanctions be kept at a minimum
consistent with assuring an opportunity for the process
to run its course." Goldstein, Police Discretio* Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 YAxE L. J. 543,
549-50 (1960).
private psychiatrists for those accused of crimes
who are not dangerous to society while they were
out on bail, confinement might well violate due
process.' 01
It may also be a denial of equal protection of the
laws to confine all those persons accused of crime
who are incompetent while permitting other de-
fendants the right to be admitted to bail. If the
incompetent is not going to receive beneficial
treatment, and he is not dangerous, then there is
no rational basis for summarily denying him the
opportunity to bail. In another situation involving
commitments, the Supreme Court of the United
States has emphasized the importance of a finding
of dangerousness. In Baxstrom v. Herold,109 the
petitioner was confined to a mental institution at
the end of his prison term on the certificate of the
prison doctor. The Supreme Court held that this
procedure was a denial of equal protection because
the petitioner was not afforded the protection of
the civil commitment statute as would any other
person who was mentally ill. Such a statute, of
course, requires a finding of dangerousness to
commit a defendant to an institution that will not
afford him proper treatment.
The District of Columbia Circuit has followed
Baxstrom to strike down the automatic commit-
ment of defendants after an acquittal by reason of
insanity. Judge Bazelon, in Bolton v. Harris,no
made dear that the automatic commitment in this
situation is a denial of equal protection. He stressed
that the defendant is entitled to a hearing with
procedures substantially similar to those found in
civil proceedings. Also, sexual psychopath laws de-
mand a finding of dangerousness in a full adversary
hearing before a defendant may be committedIu
The incompetent alone can be banished to a mental
institution for an indeterminate period without
these protections.
The argument can be made that indefinite con-
finement without treatment may be so inhumane
10  This argument would be equally valid for the
defendant who can provide his own treatment, and it
would not seem to raise serious administrative problems.
1
09 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
Uo 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Cf. Sas v. Mary-
land, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964). The automatic
commitment also seems to be a denial of the right to
bail to those defendants otherwise bailable. In a non-
capital case the security given should be no more than
is necessary to secure the defendant's presence at trial.
See generally Fp= & VAID, BAL IN = UNITED
STATES (1964).
III Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). See
also Burek, An Analysis of the Illinois Sexually Dan-
gerous Person's Act, 59 J. Cman. L. C. & P.S. 254 (1968).
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as to violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Since con-
finement without treatment is essentially punish-
ment, this view is supported by the holding in
Robinson v. California."' In this case the Supreme
Court held that it was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to punish a person for the sickness of
narcotics addiction. If the incompetent is confined
without treatment and when not dangerous, he is
essentially being punished because of his mental
disorder.
Whether or not prompted by constitutional
necessity, several reforms should be effected re-
garding the disposition of those unfit to proceed to
trial. There should be no statutory provision for
mandatory commitment, nor should the practice
result in automatic confinement. In order to in-
stitutionalize a defendant, there should be an
affirmative finding of dangerousness in a proceed-
ing (similar to a civil commitment) with proper
standards and effective safeguards."' Alterna-
tively, there should be an affirmative finding that
a good faith effort toward providing effective
treatment will result.u4 If the accused is not
dangerous and can provide his own treatment
equivalent to what he would receive in the institu-
tion, the court should admit him to bail as it would
any other defendant. n5 And the state and federal
government should endeavor to provide outpatient
- 370 U.S. 660 (1962); see also Easter v. District
of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Chronic
alcoholism is not a crime and is not punishable as such.)
1 Of course if proper safeguards are not observed,
the same dangers can infect civil type commitments.
See Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment
Proceedings, 57 Nw. U. L. 1xv. 383 (1962).
14 E.g., United States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88
(D. Vt. 1955).
115 See The Case of Bernard Goldfine, KATZ, supra n.21
at 687, where the trial court did permit a defendant to
be admitted to bail on the stipulation that he would see
a psychiatrist for treatment. Similarly, see United
States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1963).
therapy for those admitted to bail but incompetent,
or the state should provide funds to obtain private
treatment.
Reforms in Procedures for Release Upot Regaining
Competence
Today in most states, it is left to the superin-
tendent of the hospital to notify the court when
the inmate is ready for trial.n 6 The informality of
this procedure has resulted in the incompetent
sometimes becoming a forgotten man in the
mental institution. In order to correct this situa-
tion, there should be a requirement of frequent
periodic reports of his condition to the court. If the
defendant, through his counsel, contests a finding
of continued incapacity, there should be a full
scale adversary hearing on the issue of competence.
The burden of proof should be on the state to
demonstrate the accused's continued incompe-
tence.
Finally, in order to prevent lifetime commit-
ment as an incompetent, there should be a limita-
tion on the length of time that a defendant can be
held as unfit to proceed. After a two year maximum
period, he should either be committed in a strictly
civil proceeding, if necessary, or he should be re-
leased."7 In either case, to assure fairness to the
accused, the charges against him should be
dropped 1
"
6 E.g., N.Y. CoDE Cams. PRoc. § 662-b2 (McKinney
Supp. 1967). Of course the defendant can petition for
release from improper confinement by seeking a writ
of habeas corpus, Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1(1963). But he has the burden of proving his sanity.
This is virtually impossible because he is generally
confined in the state institution without access to a
lawyer or his own expert witness.1 7See, e.g., Micxi. STAT. ANNm. § 28.966 (11) sec. 27a(7) (1967). A caveat to this rule might be where the
defendant is showing improvement during the course of
his treatment.
n8 As noted above, it may be extremely difficult
for the accused to make his defense years after the
crime has occurred.
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